
Speculation was rife after the barbarous October Massacre as to why Israel’s much- vaunted intelligence gathering failed utterly to warn of incoming attack by terrorists as dawn broke on their high sabbath at the close of the Feast of Tabernacles holiday.
I soon came across claims in Zero Hedge that Israeli observers had reported frequent rehearsals in Gaza for a large attack and looked forward to reading about Caroline Glick’s researches. Overnight last Thurs-Friday the New York Times published Israel Knew Hamas’ Attack Plan More than a Year Ago! (paywall) and Caroline did a video along with re-posting her five-page article of Thursday on Jewish News Syndicate: Aharon Haliva has got to go. Now.
In arriving at her conclusion, Caroline cuts to the quick with an indictment of the nation’s deep political division being at the root of this gross failure – the equivalent of treason? Hence, the gross intellectual and intelligence incompetence! She writes, emphases added:
“What Haliva failed to mention was his habit of ignoring everything the professionals told him and not sharing their information with his superiors.
All of this would be bad enough. But it becomes even worse when seen in the framework of the 10-month insurgency the Israeli-left waged against the Netanyahu government.
That insurgency was led by Haliva’s family. His ex-wife and the mother of his children, Shira Margalit, is married to Ilan Shiloah, a senior advertising executive. Margalit and Shiloah stood behind much of the political unrest that Israel has experienced since last year. Haliva’s daughter spoke at anti-government protests. His son’s twitter feed is filled with anti-Netanyahu invective.
Haliva reportedly did not share the mountain of information his professional intelligence corps gathered on Hamas’s plans. But he reportedly repeatedly warned Netanyahu that his government’s legal reforms were emboldening Israel’s enemies and increasing the likelihood of war.
In theory, all of this could be set aside until the end of the war, except Haliva’s actions since Oct. 7 indicate that he is still informed by his false narrative about Hamas. On the eve of the ground invasion, Netanyahu addressed the public. He explained that the war is Israel’s “second war of independence,” and that it presents Israel with an “existential challenge.” In other words, Israel has no choice but to win. Netanyahu defined victory as rescuing the hostages, destroying Hamas as a military and political entity and preventing it or any other terror group from rising in Gaza ever again.
Three days later, in his first public remarks since Oct. 7, Haliva rejected Netanyahu’s description of the war as an existential conflict. Speaking to graduates of the Intelligence Corps officer training course, Haliva insisted, “It’s a war we have no choice but to fight. It isn’t an existential war.”
The difference between an existential conflict and a non-existential conflict is self-evident. You must win a war for your state’s existence. You can fight to a draw for a lesser conflict.
An intelligence chief who publicly rejects the government’s characterization of a war, whose poor professional judgment led to catastrophe and who has a history of contemptuous insubordination simply cannot be trusted to act in accordance with the government’s directives.
Oct. 7 was not prevented because many people in positions of responsibility failed the people of Israel. In most cases, it is probably reasonable to wait until after the war to part ways with them.
Haliva however, needs to go. Now.’
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